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 Weather and the Salem Witch Trials
 In her article on the potential economic mac-
 rofoundations of various witchcraft trials epi-
 sodes in European history, Emily Oster (Winter
 2004, pp. 215-228) offers a new, intriguing hy-
 pothesis regarding the Salem witch trials episode
 of 1692. Oster argues that, in general, witchcraft
 trials may be a large-scale example of violence
 and scapegoating prompted by a deterioration
 in economic conditions brought on primarily by
 an increase in winter severity and food short-
 ages. Moreover, the most active period in witch-
 craft trials coincides with a period of lower than
 average temperatures known to climatologists as
 the "little ice age," dating (roughly) from 1550
 to 1800.
 Oster's focus on winter weather severity
 weakens a new hypothesis in Carlson (1999),
 that the physical condition of the accusers
 (melancholia/delirium, hallucinations, ma-
 nia, etc.) in Salem, Massachusetts, in 1691-
 1692 can be explained by an epidemic of en-
 cephalitis, a mosquito-borne illness exhibiting
 many of the same symptoms possessed by the
 accusers. The Salem witchcraft episode began
 in the winter of 1691-1692, which is consistent
 with Oster's argument. According to the Divi-
 sion of Vector-Borne Infectious diseases at the
 Centers for Disease Control, symptoms of the
 modern Eastern Equine Encephalitis-a vari-
 ant of the strain believed by Carlson to have
 caused the physical symptoms of the witchcraft
 accusers in Salem in 1692-appear in only 4 to
 10 days from being bitten by an infected mos-
 quito. This suggests that any mosquito activity
 behind the Salem episode would have oc-
 curred during winter, when mosquitoes are
 already in their resting or hibernation period.
 It is likely also that any winter in the middle of
 the "little ice age," such as the one of 1691-
 1692, would have prompted an earlier-than-
 usual mosquito hibernation. Thus, biological,
 climate and epidemiological data favor Oster's
 economic macrofoundations thesis, not Carl-
 son's encephalitis hypothesis.
 Oster's macrofoundations thesis should not,
 however, be seen as a substitute for public
 choice (or economic microfoundations) inter-
 pretations of events in various witchcraft epi-
 sodes, such as the (arguably) most famous one
 in Salem. Mixon (2000) suggests that the
 witchcraft episode in Salem was prompted by
 Reverend Samuel Parris' attempt to increase
 the demand for Puritan ministerial services
 (that is, to fill the village meetinghouse and to
 convince the congregation to pay his salary),
 which was sagging at the time (see also Boyer
 and Nissenbaum, 1974). Mixon and Trevifio
 (2003), supported by Boyer and Nissenbaum
 (1974), also argue that a secondary catalyst in
 the Salem episode was western (Salem) Villag-
 ers' attempts to prevent eastern (Salem) Vil-
 lagers' efforts to align Salem Village with the
 economic, political and religious interests of
 (the contiguous) Salem Town. They point out
 a vast majority (and a statistically significant
 proportion) of the accused resided in East
 Salem Village, while a vast majority (and sta-
 tistically significant proportion) of the accus-
 ers resided in West Salem Village (Mixon and
 Trevifio, 2003). These public choice interpre-
 tations seem to complement Oster's argument
 that severe winter weather contributed to the
 witchcraft episodes during the period 1550-
 1800.
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 Rationality and Voting
 TimothyJ. Feddersen (Winter 2004, pp. 99-
 112) offers some interesting insights into he-
 roic attempts to resolve the paradox of not
 voting. Even though individuals have only a
 minuscule probability of changing electoral
 outcomes, they turn out to vote in substantial
 numbers.
 The classic work of Downs (1957) on the
 reasons individuals vote depends on instru-
 mental "investment" appraisal-that is, indi-
 viduals are viewed as analyzing their net ex-
 pected utility from changing the outcome of
 the election. Thus Downs predicted that indi-
 viduals would remain "rationally ignorant,"
 meaning that they would have no incentive to
 learn anything about the election because
 their individual vote is so unlikely to alter the
 outcome. Indeed, Blais and Young (1999) re-
 port experimental evidence that turnout falls
 when the decision to vote is described only in
 Downsian terms-that is, in terms of instru-
 mental costs and benefits.
 But if individuals truly follow the prescription
 of rational ignorance with regard to voting, they
 may choose to be completely ignorant of the
 "investment" reasons for not voting. It is inter-
 nally inconsistent to argue that rational individ-
 uals have no reason to engage in this instrumen-
 tal evaluation-and then to analyze voting
 patterns based on the proposition that the net
 expected utility from changing outcome is posi-
 tive. With no incentive to focus on instrumental
 net expected gain, the decision of whether to
 vote is sensitive to perceptions of the intrinsic
 value of action.
 Thus, the focus shifts away from whether vot-
 ing has instrumental investment benefits and
 instead to whether voting offers intrinsic con-
 sumption benefits. Therefore, Fedderson
 (p. 101) suggests the possibility of a "consump-
 tion benefit ... from the act of voting." The im-
 portance of consumption benefits of voting is
 predictable precisely because it is irrational to
 engage in an instrumetal calculus about whether
 a vote will alter an election.
 In focusing on the consumption benefits of
 voting, Jones and Hudson (2000) distinguish
 between the decision of whether to vote and how
 to vote. The decision to vote depends on con-
 sumption benefits of taking such an action.
 Once a decision to vote is made, then the deci-
 sion of how to vote depends on perceptions
 of electoral alternatives with which voters will
 associate.
 The intrinsic consumption benefits of voting
 might be derived from performing civic duty
 and from expressing preference. An individual
 is said to be "intrinsically motivated to perform
 an activity when one receives no apparent
 reward except the activity itself' (Deci, 1971,
 p. 105). Intrinsic motivation to perform an act
 (or "duty") is based on moral and ethical con-
 siderations, but it is also affected by external
 intervention. In this context, individuals re-
 spond to low-cost signals that acknowledge the
 intrinsic value of action (Frey, 1997).
 For example, individuals more willingly par-
 ticipate in voting the greater the esteem asso-
ciated with participation-although it isn't
 clear whether this esteem is based on internal
 motivation or on signaling to others. Jones
 and Hudson (2000, 2001) demonstrate that in
 the 1997 UK General Election, a spate of alle-
 gations of "political sleaze" proved an impor-
 tant determinant of turnout. Individuals were
 less likely to incur costs of participation in a
 process demeaned by politicians. Levels of per-
 ceived integrity of politicians proved statisti-
 cally significant when explaining turnout; dif-
 ferences in perceptions of political integrity and
 policy proved important when explaining how
 individuals voted.
 In more recent work, we have looked at in-
 tended turnout in national elections across the
 EU in 2003 using Eurobarometer data. We find
 that intention to vote is significantly linked to
 the importance of voting as proxied by the per-
 ceived impact of national government upon the
 individual, which at first glance tends to support
 the "investment" notion that people vote in the
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